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POTENTIAL PERSONS AND THE WELFARE OF THE 
(POTENTIAL) CHILD TEST 
 
ABSTRACT 
This paper considers the theoretical basis of ‘the welfare of the child’ as it exists in the 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 (as amended by the 2008 Act of the same 
name). It will be argued that potential persons, that is persons who do not yet exist, have 
no claims, interests or standing that can restrict the actions of actual persons. This claim 
will be based upon the necessity of existence before things can be said to affect a person. As 
persons are the subject for whom good and bad apply, actions which establish the pre-
conditions for their existence cannot be subjected to considerations of the effect on the 
potential person. This is because potential persons are not affected by actions, but are the 
consequence of actions. Prospective parents, for example, should not be prohibited from 
having disabled offspring on the basis of the effect on the child, as different decisions 
relating to that child will change which persons exist, and thus the necessary pre-
conditions for value will change. Based upon this logical framework it will be argued that 
only the interests of actual persons can constrain the actions of those involved in 
reproduction. Thus, the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act’s formulation of the 
welfare test must be repealed and only the interests of prospective parents and other 
actually existing people should be capable of constraining reproduction. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Developments in fertility treatment and artificial reproductive technology (ART) have 
created an unprecedented level of control of the process of reproduction. Prospective 
parents now have many options for fulfilling their desire to have children; everything 
from artificial insemination to in vitro fertilisation, from adoption to surrogacy and 
possibly through genetic modification. In response to the development of these 
technologies the UK government established the Committee of Inquiry into Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology (1982-1984) to consider the implications and responses to 
these emerging reproductive technologies. The Committee then produced a report (also 
known as the Warnock Report) which then formed the basis for a draft bill that was 
passed into law as the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 (hereafter the 
‘HFE Act’). This Act created the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority which 
has regulatory oversight of all fertility treatment and reproductive services (although this 
regulatory function may be transferred to the Care Quality Commission and others1. The 
HFE Act contained a provision in section 13(5), which requires that “the welfare of any 
child who may be born as a result of the treatment” be taken into account2. It is the 
welfare of the (potential) child test as it exists in the HFE Act that is questioned and 
critiqued in this article. 
 It will be argued that the welfare test when applies to the potential child is 
problematic because it is too burdensome on prospective parents (hereafter parents); 
both because it requires that the parents are vetted to determine whether they are 
‘suitable’ and because the test imposes obligations on the parents for the sake of the 
child (most noticeably in the case of disability). Moreover, if these obligations are 
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followed then the child will never come to exist and this in effect requires that parents 
act for a never existing child. Equally, if genetic modification technology became 
available it would require that parents use it to improve the welfare outcome of the 
potential child. The welfare of the potential child test therefore creates a discriminatory 
system in which those who cannot reproduce naturally are doubly penalised; they must 
prove their competence to be parents, and the test creates strong prejudice against 
parents who want to produce a child who has, or might have, a disability. These 
restrictions thus need to be strongly explicated in order to justify the imposition of such 
onerous obligations on parents and also the denial of services to those who may not wish 
to undergo genetic testing for disability or those who may want to have a child with a 
particular disability. 
 The justification for restricting access to reproductive technology, as shown by 
section 13(5), is the “welfare of any [potential] child who may be born”3. It is the benefits 
and welfare that accrue to the potential child that justify considering the conduct of the 
parents and the risk of disability. However, it will be argued that consideration of the 
welfare of the potential child is not valid because it is incorrect that a child can be 
benefitted or harmed by actions that cause them to exist; that is, actions which constitute 
the person cannot affect that same person because their existence is a necessary pre-condition for 
them to benefit or harmed. As David Heyd states: “they [potential persons] do not meet 
certain preconditions of existence and identity” 4 which would allow them to be the 
object of beneficence or maleficence. Thus the welfare of the potential child cannot be 
the basis of claims regarding benefiting or harming the child, the considerations that are 
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used to restrict access to reproductive technology and service are unfounded. This 
becomes even more apparent when the denial of access to reproductive technology 
services means that no child ever exists. As the child never exists it is logically impossible 
for them to ‘benefitted’ or ‘harmed’ but this also applies in reverse, a child who does 
come to exist cannot be benefitted or harmed either. This is what Heyd calls “full 
symmetry” between benefitting and harming in both cases of not bringing, and of 
bringing a child to exist. 
 Consequently, the law relating to reproductive technology and services will have 
to be reformed by removing the ‘welfare of the potential child’ test from the HFE Act 
because it is based upon of a concept of harm in which harm is impossible. Using the 
example of genetic modification, the implications of this test for what is permissible will 
be explored, and the scope of parents’ decisions will be explicated. These implications do 
not however suggest that parents should have unrestricted access to these services, 
(because resource constraints and distributive justice are also involved) but they do mean 
that parents cannot be denied access to genetic modification services on the basis of 
harming a child who will never exist; and who cannot be harmed if they do exist. Only 
on the basis of the impact on other actual persons and member of the socio-political unit 
can claim to be affected by allowing parents to have disabled offspring. Furthermore, the 
welfare of the child once it actually exists is covered by the ‘welfare of the child test’ 
found in section one of the Children Act 1989, thus providing a means for dealing with 
parents if they are abusive to their offspring. Society could therefore decide that people 
who want to be parents have to conform to a certain standard of conduct and comport 
themselves in a certain manner, but this would have to apply to all parents (whether 
using reproductive technology or conceiving naturally) because the determination and 
judgement is located in the parents themselves. The arguments that will now be 
presented will support the final recommendations of this paper; namely that the welfare 
of the potential child test in the HFE Act must be removed and that the determination 
of access to reproductive services should be based upon the effect on actual persons, or 
a standard applicable to all. 
 
II. THE WELFARE OF THE (POTENTIAL) CHILD TEST 
Under section 13(5) of the HFE Act, the welfare of the child test operates as follows: 
 
“A woman shall not be provided with services … unless account has been taken of 
the welfare of the child who may be born as a result of the treatment (including the 
need of that child for supportive parenting), and of any other child who may be 
affected by the birth” 
 
The HFE Authority’s 8th Code of Practice guidance notes on the welfare of the 
child state that the “factors to be taken into account during the assessment process” of 
the parents include the risk of “serious physical or psychological harm or neglect”5 and 
“where the medical history indicates that any child who may be born is likely to suffer 
from a serious medical condition”6. Subsections 13(9) and 13(10) of the Act, inserted by 
the amending 2008 Act, state that “embryos known to have” a serious disability, illness 
or “other serious medical condition” “must not be preferred to those [embryos] that are 
not known to have such an abnormality”7. Together, these legislative provisions and 
code of practice notes make two things clear; that the conduct of parents is subject to 
scrutiny and that parents cannot select for an embryo that has a disability, but can reject 
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an embryo on that basis. As both sets of considerations operate under the welfare of the 
(potential) child test, it is clear that the reasons and justifications for these considerations 
are rooted in assumptions that they are harmful to the child’s welfare. 
Thus a positive determination that the potential child will be subject to abuse or 
neglect, or will have a serious disability, will prevent the parents from accessing 
reproductive services, frustrating in its entirety their interest and desire to have children. 
This places parents in the invidious position of not being able to have children without 
medical help, but also of being judged both on their characteristics and their choice of 
foetus. Moreover, if any of these judgements go against them then the child they would 
supposedly be harming would never even exist. Persons who do not exist cannot be 
harmed because their non-existence precludes anything affecting them in any sense. We 
will come to the impossibility of harming potential persons in due course, for now we 
can note the effects of the current legal regime. Firstly, by requiring those who seek 
reproductive services to prove their ability to be ‘good’ parents those who are already at a 
severe disadvantage are further penalised. The institutional burden imposed on them, 
which is not imposed on other members of society, could be construed as an 
unacceptable interference with the parent’s reproductive autonomy. Reproductive 
autonomy could be found under Articles 8 and 12 of the European Convention of 
Human Rights and thus would need to be strongly justified. The discussion of 
reproductive autonomy, and whether there is a right to it, is beyond the scope of this 
paper. However, it should be noted that the arguments presented here mean that the 
requirement of proving parental capability would not make sense on the basis of the potential 
child’s welfare. Requiring proof of parenting competence could be justified if applied to all 
potential parents, but it would have to be a universal requirement. Thus the justification 
for the burden of proving parental capability would be moved solely to the parents and 
would not be related to the potential child.  
More importantly though the demand that disabled embryos are not to be 
preferred and the fact that disability counts against the potential child’s welfare implies 
that there is an obligation not to have disabled children. This obligation can be inferred 
because the logical corollary of the statement that disabled foetuses “are not be 
preferred” 8 is that non-disabled foetuses are to be preferred. This restriction on having 
disabled offspring removes the choice of parents and mandates what they can and 
cannot do. Furthermore, if genetic modification could improve the potential child’s 
‘welfare’ then it may be required of parents to use genetic technology because the basis 
of the constraints are the potential child’s interests which (as shown by the restrictions 
imposed on parents by the HFE Act now) are strong enough to force parents to refrain 
from acting (and thus logically require them to act) in certain ways. 
As this is justified on the basis that disability is against the potential child’s 
welfare then if this is not the case the preference for non-disabled offspring and the 
constraint imposed on the parents must be removed. Parents could therefore not be 
prevented from having disabled offspring if they so wished, at least on the basis that it is 
against the child’s interests. The welfare of the potential child then is the source of the 
problems that are thrown up by applying the welfare test to those seeking access to 
reproductive technology; namely that the potential child welfare acts as justification for 
restricting who can have children and under what conditions when in fact the child’s 
welfare cannot be affected by any decision made. It is to this person-affecting dilemma to 
which we now turn. 
 
III. WELFARE OF THE CHILD: WHAT CHILD? 
                                                 
8 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 s.14. 
The fundamental problem with the welfare of the (potential) child test is that welfare by 
definition is for someone but in this case the person concerned does not exist. The welfare 
of the child test, contained in the HFE Act s.13(5), explicitly includes the concept of 
harm to the potential persons, thus identifying the potential child as the subject affected. 
This is, however, a logical impossibility because the necessary condition for welfare to be 
considered, that is the existence of a person, is not met. Moreover, if the potential 
person’s welfare is considered to be at risk, then they will never come to exist so they will 
never benefit from this welfare decision. As welfare is person-affecting it is predicated 
upon the existence of someone for whom welfare is for, but this person must therefore 
be able to value or disvalue things which affect their welfare; that is, they must be a 
‘valuer’. As value cannot exist without valuers (in this case, welfare cannot exist without 
being for someone) then “valuers have the unique status as the condition of there being any 
value”9. In the cases under discussion (parents seeking reproductive services to produce a 
child) the only valuers for whom the decision can be of value are the parents. The 
potential child therefore cannot have a welfare that can be affected when it is the 
decision which will determine whether it exists or not. 
This seems clear, and highlights the fact that deciding against the existence of 
potential person cannot count as beneficial to them. Obviously it could be beneficial to the 
parents as existing valuers, because they would not have the burden of raising a (disabled 
or non-disabled) child, and it could be beneficial for other actual members of society, for 
example, due to the consumption or distribution of healthcare resources. But it is 
painfully obvious that it cannot be beneficial to the potential person when they will never 
exist. For example, genetically modifying an embryo so that it no longer has a genetic 
disability would not benefit it, because the decision to genetically modify would 
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constitute the potential person; that is, it would be a decision prior to and determinative 
of their existence. There is no basis for the claim that offspring are harmed by genetic 
modification when it is that genetic modification which causes them to exist. 
Furthermore “equally and for the same reasons, we cannot hold the child to be an 
object maleficence”10. Just as a valuer needs to exist before they can benefit from things 
so they have to exist before they can be harmed by things. For example, a potential 
disabled child cannot be harmed by being brought into existence. Thus “potential people 
have equal standing regarding our beneficence and our nonmaleficence”11 which is to say 
they have no standing. However this also means that creating new valuers is itself of no 
value independent of those valuers who already exist, there thus can never be any 
presumption to implant an (or any) embryo. This also means that there can never be a 
presumption against implanting an (or any) embryo. It is only on the basis of the 
interests of actual persons, the parents, that decisions regarding offspring can be made. 
Once the potential person does exist then they can be affected by the 
circumstance in which they exist. The necessary pre-condition for value (harm and 
benefit) to attached someone have been met (by their existence) and from there onwards 
they possess interests because they being to form a biographical life. A biographical life 
consists of the actions, desires, projects and decisions that make up a life12; that is the 
components that give a life consistency. It should thus be self-evident that an existing 
child has interests that can be accounted for and protected, and these post-existence 
effects can form the basis of welfare decisions. At this point the Children Act 1989 
section one would be applicable and which would protect the actually existing child, 
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further eroding the purpose and need for the welfare test in the HFE Act. The case of 
disability is a good example of the argument outlined above. 
If an embryo has the genetic characteristics of a being disabled the HFE Act 
considers the disability to count as the basis of rejecting that embryo, and prohibits 
selecting that embryo when a non-disabled embryo is available13. This is so even though 
the offspring would not actually come into existence because the embryo has been 
rejected and thus no subject would ever exist to benefit or suffer harm from the decision 
taken. However, this also applies to a decision to allow the disabled embryo to develop 
to term, because the potential person must exist before the person-affecting nature of 
value can be present. In such cases (rejection, acceptance or modification of the disabled 
embryo) the potential person cannot be affected by the decision taken, but the parents 
can. Thus, it is their interests which are relevant when deciding which embryo to implant 
and it is up to them to determine whether having offspring with a disability is against or 
in their interests. Once a child exists (whether disabled or not) then the pre-condition for 
value to be for them has been met and they will possess interests that can benefited or 
harmed. The welfare of the child test under the Children Act will now apply and 
judgements regarding the child’s welfare can now be made, thus forming the basis of 
decisions and actions about the child’s upbringing and care. 
As noted throughout this paper, the basis of removing the potential person (the 
child who may result) from consideration is the necessity of their existence before they 
can be harmed or benefitted. This applies equally to negative constraints (such as not 
selecting certain embryos) and positive requirements (such as genetically modifying an 
embryo). Consequently it is impossible to maintain the HFE concept of the welfare of 
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the offspring who results from the treatment because potential people have no welfare to 
speak of. The welfare of the (potential) child test should therefore be abolished and the 
consideration of the potential child removed as a factor for consideration when deciding 
on distributing reproductive technology and services. Any restrictions or constraints 
imposed upon parents would then have to be based upon the impact on actual persons 
which would include the parents seeking reproductive aid and the other actual members 
of their socio-political unit (more on this later). The general form of the test found in the 
Children Act, with its focus on existing offspring, would, of course, retain its applicability 
to offspring once they exist.  
We can thus see how this change would eliminate the restriction on parents when 
it comes to the selection of different embryos for implantation. Next we will consider an 
alternative to the person-affecting approach; impersonalism. If there is an alternative to 
the claim that welfare must person-affecting, then this may undermine the claim that 
welfare must be for someone. This alternative, however, can only be based on a non-
person-affecting account; namely impersonalism.  
 
IV. IMPERSONALISM: THE ALTERNATIVE TO THE PERSON-AFFECTING 
APPROACH 
As has been made clear throughout this paper the welfare of the (potential) child is 
logically unsustainable if welfare is attached to a subject. Thus, if welfare can be framed 
in such a way that it does not attach to a subject, then this would offer another method 
for regulation to incorporate the welfare test. To be clear, impersonalism here is not “a 
common standard”14 that is good for everyone; as this would simply be claiming that there 
is some x which is good for all subjects who exist. It would thus still be tied to the actual 
                                                 
14 Heyd, People 82 
existence of people but would simply be a claim that x is good for all of them. This 
obviously would not be an alternative to, or an answer to, the argument set out above 
because it would still require that a person exist for them to benefit from the common 
standard. Here, impersonalism is used to mean the existence of value as a feature of the 
world; that is value is independent of persons and attaches “to the world”15. This stance 
would thus identify what is ‘good’ and claim that the more of this good, the better 
because it is as a feature of the world that it has value, not as it relates to persons (if they 
exist). 
So what might an impersonalist approach look like? Julian Savulescu argues for 
an approach in which the offspring “who is expected to have the best life, or at least as a 
good as life as the others”16 should be chosen. We would therefore not select a disabled 
foetus because it would not have the best expected life. However as Rebecca Bennett 
puts it “This individual is born in this impaired state or not at all”17, and thus the choice 
is between the existences of different potential people and on a person-affecting account 
this raises the same problems outlined above. Consequently, we could not say it is better 
for those who will not exist, as this would be to take a person-affecting perspective. Of 
course on a person-affecting view we could say that it is better for those of us who 
actually exist that this particular potential person does not exist. For Savulescu’s 
comparison to work it would have to be based upon impersonal criteria, particularly as 
the existence of each potential person is mutually exclusive of the others. In order to 
avoid relying on the effect on any people, what we would have to say is that the world is a 
better place with those particular potential person in it rather than these other potential 
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17 R Bennett ‘The Fallacy of the Principle of Procreative Beneficence’ (2009) Bioethics 263, 267. 
persons because those we allow to exist will contribute more ‘good’ (in this case the best 
lives) to the state of the world. That is the world is better off than with alternative 
persons in it because they add to the total ‘good’ in the world. Alternatively, it could be 
that impersonalism is based upon being the right kind of person (i.e. being human 
consists of suffering and limitation18). 
The essential problem with impersonalism is that it “sacrifices the utility of 
individuals to the promotion of the impersonal value of the overall good”19. In other 
words, whatever the ‘good’ is, people are merely a means to produce the good, and thus 
individuals are always expendable. This means that people are not relevant beyond the 
production of the good, for example, if health was the primary good (as suggested in 
Savulescu’s scenario) then all parents could be forced to undergo whatever procedure 
best produced health, as long as the cost in the health of the parents was outweighed by 
the gain in the offspring. If impersonalism is based upon creating the right kind of 
people then this balancing act would be unnecessary; it would only be when the wrong 
kind of offspring were to be produced that parents would have to take measures to 
prevent it whatever those measures are. Now it is obvious that if impersonalism is correct, 
then the subjugation of individuals to the production of the good or to the creation of 
the right kind of person, is not only permissible but an obligation. The restrictions 
imposed upon individuals could thus be justified. 
But impersonalism is not a sound or coherent theory because the identification 
of the ‘good’ or the right kind of people unavoidably presupposes the existence of valuers. 
The good that forms the basis of impersonalism (whatever it is) are “by necessity of 
                                                 
18 L Kass, ‘Ageless Bodies, Happy Souls: Biotechnology and the Pursuit of Perfection’ (2003) The New 
Atlantis 9. 
19 Heyd, People 57. 
actual”20 persons. Without actual persons, that is valuers, it is impossible to differentiate 
between different conceptions of the good because a world without persons is valueless. 
Otherwise anything could be good, even the murder of humans could be justified on the 
basis that it is more natural for a predator species to behave in such a manner and thus 
promoting the good of the natural world. Thus the existence of persons, who can 
identify the good, are a pre-requisite for impersonalism to work, but this is the very basis 
that impersonalism claims to do without. More to the point, impersonalism itself gives all 
individuals a reason to reject it because it could impose upon them a good which they do 
not find to be good. Impersonalism can therefore only work at one level of discourse; 
namely the identification of objective goods for a particular reference group. It cannot be used 
to justify the existence of members of that reference group because the identification of 
value to potential people is impossible. Furthermore the identification of a good to which 
persons are subservient is not possible, because ‘good’ has to relate to the person or 
persons affected. 
Thus we cannot resort to impersonalism to solve the conundrum of impossibility 
of the child who may result possessing welfare interests because it provides reasons for 
individuals to reject it by reducing persons to mere producers of a good and thus 
justifying any restriction or interference which promotes this good. It is also conceptually 
incoherent as the good cannot be identified without presupposing the existence of the 
reference group (valuers). Once the reference group exists then the conception of the 
good becomes person-affecting, as only by tying good to valuers does it make sense to 
differentiate between potential goods. The arguments pertaining to the illogical and 
impossible conception of welfare for a potential person remain valid and cannot be replaced 
with impersonalism. We therefore have to accept that the welfare of the potential child 
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test is unsustainable and that the law is wrong to have such a test because it is factually 
impossible for the test to have any effect on the person it supposedly protects. The only 
option left is to remove the test completely. This does not however mean that parents 
have or should have unfettered decision-making powers over reproduction, but it does 
mean that such restrictions must be based upon the interests of actual persons; in this 
case the parents, and the other members of their socio-political unit. It is to this 
consideration that we now turn. 
 
V. THE DECISIONS OF PROSPECTIVE PARENTS 
Having dispensed with the welfare of the potential child test we need to decide if and on 
what basis the reproductive decisions of prospective parents could be constrained. As 
the preceding section pointed out, without the welfare test and the requirement that the 
decisions take a person-affecting form means that reproductive “genesis choices … 
should be guided exclusively by reference to the interests, welfare, ideals, rights and 
duties of those making the choice” 21 . Those who are making the choices are the 
“generators” of the (pro)creative effort and, as it is their interests that are of concern, 
Heyd calls this theory of their predominance “generocentrism”22. Generocentric theory 
will form the foundation of the new reformed approach to reproduction, specifically in 
the case of parents utilising reproductive technology and services where the decisions of 
the parents are contingent upon the acceptance of those providing the service for the 
decisions to take affect. Artificial reproduction therefore provides a case in point where 
the interests of other actual persons and the interests of parents intersect. 
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From the arguments set out throughout this article culminating the generocentric 
theory, there can be no restrictions imposed upon parents from the perspective of the 
potential child. Parents should therefore have greater control over the reproductive 
process unconstrained by the supposed impact on the potential child. What is of interest 
here is what possible constraints there might be for the parents in the absence of the 
welfare of a potential child. As pointed out earlier, any such constraints would have to be 
based upon either the interests of other people or upon a requirement for the parents to 
meet a standard of conduct. Given the emphasis on the person-affecting nature of 
actions, an approach grounded upon the interests of other people is the only justification 
for restricting the actions of parents, but this could of course take the form of a standard 
of conduct. However, we will avoid becoming encumbered by discussions between the 
relative merits of the different forms the restrictions may take. We shall instead focus on 
the effects which would justify imposing the constraints. 
Some examples are; the increase of healthcare costs, ensuring genetic diversity for 
the gene pool, preventing hyper-aggression, improving immune systems, muscle 
strength, liver function, and brain functioning and so on. The justification for restraints 
could also relate to the kind of society that we are trying to build, whether it is strongly 
democratic and pluralistic with a strong sense of individualism, or whether strict 
conformity to a particular ideal is required or whether reproduction is considered a 
collective effort or interest. Given that the jurisdiction under discussion is the UK, this 
paper takes it as given that the constraints have to be compatible with a democratic 
pluralist human rights respecting society. In this case the basis of restrictions has to be 
proven by those seeking to restrict the actions of the parents. This would be even stricter 
if a formal right to reproduction or reproductive autonomy were to be created or 
recognised, because the restriction would also have to be necessary and proportional. 
However the decision as to whether there should be such a right is beyond the scope of 
this paper. 
Thus it must be noted that this person-affecting approach would entail a strong 
form of reproductive autonomy for parents generally in the area of reproduction as the 
impact upon others would have to be proven. For example, if someone claims that it 
would be harmful to have a disabled child then they must show to what interests it is 
harmful; it could not be based upon simply disapproving of the choice. It is therefore 
plausible that only a significant interest could restrict parental decisions. Such a 
significant interest might be the interest of actual persons to have access to healthcare. 
Thus parents who choose to have disabled offspring might be constrained on the basis 
that the additional resource burden on the healthcare system and the subsequent effect 
on people’s interests make the choice to have disabled offspring an unreasonable 
expectation for the use of public resources. It could not however be based upon the 
harm done to the parents themselves, because it is up to them whether the burden of 
raising disabled offspring is outweighed by the benefits of having a child; but it could 
easily be based upon the effect on others. Such a justification would bring in concerns of 
fair distribution of resources, safeguarding and balancing conflicting interests (and/or 
rights) amongst a population, population growth policy and societal aims, changes or 
objectives. One scenario may be that the interests of actual persons make it preferable to 
ensure a universally accessible standard of reproductive technology rather than a private 
system that only some could afford. 
Other modifications however may be problematic, skin colour, for example, may 
be something that remains outside of parental remit not because it may create a burden 
or thwart the interests of others, but because allowing such a choice in a society which 
unjustifiably discriminates against certain skin colours may cause reproduction (and 
genetic modification) to be used to reinforce racism and other prejudices. Such a 
consequence could be opposed because diversity is valued by society as leading to a 
richer and deeper culture, because it is a superficial difference, or because the promotion 
of a united human governmental system or human rights culture are considered 
important for improving the lives of actual persons. In this case the justification could be 
based upon the harm done to actual persons in the sense that they would live in a society 
that is worse for them because it violates the basic principles or objective of society. 
Deciding on what may and may not be permitted is up to the socio-political unit where 
artificial reproduction takes place; it is beyond the scope of this paper to consider the 
political methods which should be used. However, in no case could it be based upon the 
potential person themselves, as it is impossible for them to have interests and because 
they are irrelevant themselves except for their value to extant persons. 
Finally, imposing constraints on parents may be justified because we (that is, the 
rest of society) do not want them to achieve or satisfy their interests. For example, parents 
who want to inflict suffering and harm on a person may be prohibited from utilising 
reproductive technology and services because we do not want to help people satisfy their 
desires to act in cruel and abusive ways by creating a child. In such cases we are not 
saying that the child’s interests would be harmed by being created for such a purpose and 
once they exist, their interests would justify removing the child from the parents 
although this may be a difficult and protracted process. Rather, we are saying that the 
very interest the parents seek to fulfil is prohibited and thus they cannot be permitted to 
achieve their goal. This would be similar to not allowing people to vandalise public or 
abandoned property, to torture willing ‘victims’ or to take class A drugs even if no one is 
directly harmed by such conduct. This is because some conduct is deemed unacceptable 
by society and those who would use reproductive technology and services to fulfil these 
prohibited objectives could be prevented from doing so. 
Regardless, within the UK and other democratic pluralist human rights respecting 
nations, the interests and decisions of the parents would be primary. This approach 
would therefore create a legal presumption or right in favour of permitting prospective 
parents to reproduce the offspring they wish, and those who wish to restrict the actions 
of parents would have to make their case and provide evidence of their claims. Thus the 
person-affecting approach does not preclude restricting the actions of prospective 
parents on the basis of the interests of other persons or on the basis that prospective 
parents should act in certain ways. This would be based on competing interests between 
societies, existing members and the parents. This provides the justification for judicial 
oversight of reproductive technology, while protecting parents from being denied access 
to reproductive services on the basis of the welfare of the potential child. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The fundamental argument of this paper is that potential persons have no standing 
(moral, ethical or legal) in relation to those who actually exist. A potential person cannot 
benefit from existing or not and neither can a potential person be harmed. Consequently, 
when it comes to reproduction, the interests of prospective parents are unconstrained by 
the effect of their actions on their potential offspring because actions which cause a 
person to exist cannot affect them. Parents are thus free to choose to have disabled, 
genetically modified or ‘normal’ offspring as they wish. The only source of restrictions 
on parental conduct comes from the effect of their actions on other actual persons. This 
approach is explicitly person-affecting which has as a pre-condition for it to apply that a 
person actually exists. It is this that underpins the argument that potential persons have 
no standing compared to the interests of actual persons, be they parents or members of 
society. 
 The importance of this change in outlook is prompted by the welfare of the 
(potential) child test included in decisions about access to reproductive services by 
infertile couples. This is objectionable because those already experiencing difficulties in 
having children are further penalised by having to prove their capacity to be parents; and 
all this because of a potential person who cannot be affected by their actions anyway. 
The point at which the potential offspring becomes actual (when the child can be 
affected) is covered by the Children Act 1989 anyway. Thus parents have their choices, 
decisions and actions restricted by the interests of a being that does not exist. When we 
consider the impossibility of harming potential persons we can see that this is an 
unjustified restriction imposed upon parents which consequently should be removed. 
Only by taking an impersonalist non-person-affecting approach could we avoid this 
difficulty. 
 Impersonalism has however be shown to be incoherent and flawed because it is 
abhorrent to individuals by making them into producers of value (reducing their own 
interests into irrelevance) and because it presupposes the existence of valuers in order to 
determine and identify the value(s) that are to be produced. Note once again that this is 
not to say that impersonal considerations are irrelevant when considering benefits across 
an identified reference group, but that the very foundation of benefit, harm and value 
cannot be disconnected from the existence of evaluators. Thus impersonalism needs 
persons to exist before it can have any meaningful content, but it then discounts the 
interests those persons have once they do exist. The alternative to the person-affecting 
approach is therefore untenable, and this brings us full circle back to the determination 
of the welfare of the potential child test as unacceptable and leaves with only the 
interests of actual persons to consider. 
Thus parental decisions would be unrestricted by the concept of harming their 
future offspring as those actions are the ones which bring the offspring into existence. 
Parents would thus be able to utilise reproductive technology (including genetic 
modification) with only legitimate public interest limiting their actions. Of course medical 
providers will have obligations to the parents and parental actions will be restricted by 
the technological capabilities of the time. Moreover, depending on how services are 
provided, for example, by a public or private system, parental decisions will be limited by 
different constraints. What is made clear is that parental interests have primacy and can 
only be overridden by the interests of other existing citizens, and not by the interests of 
the potential offspring. This could lead to a legal presumption that parental decisions to 
have disabled offspring or genetically modify their offspring are in their interests and that 
if others want to prevent such modification going ahead, then the burden is on them to 
prove that there is a sufficient public interest or harm being caused to actual persons. 
As we have seen, this may take a number of forms, but can be based on the 
harms caused directly to other persons, the fairness and distribution of resources or on 
the ideals a society holds. For example, we want to prevent those who sadistically want to 
torture people from achieving their aims, or we want to ensure that every member of 
society has access to services on a equal basis and so some limitations to the number of 
times reproductive services are accessed is imposed. Another example may be 
prohibiting the selection of skin colour because we do not want to exist in a more 
prejudiced society than we do now. All of these examples, whether to do with the harm 
caused to a specific individual, the fairness of healthcare access between the entire 
population, population control policy or because of the particular ideals a society holds 
are based upon the impact and effect of actions on existing actual persons. Restrictions 
and constraints imposed on this basis are therefore permissible and justifiable. However, 
depending on what form the parents’ interests take, for example, human rights, will 
affect the strength needed of the justification and the degree to which interference can 
extend. 
The reform recommend here, the removal of the welfare of the (potential) child 
test in relation to artificial reproductive services, would clearly make the interests of the 
prospective parents paramount. As the parents are the ones whose interests would be 
fulfilled by reproduction and because it is such a major component of their lives it is fair 
that the decision is accepted unless it can be shown that their decision is harmful to an 
actual person or because it violates the standards of conduct held in the socio-political 
unit. A decisions as to whether parental discretion should be embodied in a human or 
legal right is a discussion for another time. It is clear, however, that the injustice and 
unfairness imposed by the welfare of the (potential) child test is untenable and should be 
excised as part of the process of artificial reproduction. If the actions of prospective 
parents do not harm anyone or violate behavioural codes then they should be free to 
reproduce as they wish. 
